Research

Working Papers

An Organizational Theory of Political Parties
Political economy does not use organizational economics to build theories of parties, and organizational economics does not have any models tailored to the unique characteristics of political parties, as opposed to private profit-maximizing firms. In this work, I build an organizational economics style model of political parties, tracing through the emergence of the modern political party through an adapted theory of the firm lens. I show how party leadership can wield effective power even when the members that face their power can always depose them. I then use this model to inspire a reduced-form for a multi-party model of coalition formation. I show how having an ``organizational" conception of political party-coalitions changes the logic of ideological conditions which make parties strong, and what party systems can be stable. (New Draft Coming Soon!)

Presented at: 2023 Asian School in Economic Theory; 9th Workshop on Relational Contracts; 2024 Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Conference; 2024 Midwest Political Science Association Conference (Session Organizer); 2024 Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics; GAMES 2024, the 7th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (Session Organizer); WUSTL Conference for Early Career Scholars in Theoretical Political Economy (Scheduled); University of Chicago Harris Political Economy Lunch (Scheduled); 2025 European Political Science Association Conference (Scheduled); 

Works in Progress

Relational Contracts  and the Theory of Autocracy with Scott Gehlbach and Zhaotian Luo
Presented at: University of Chicago Harris Political Economy Lunch; Utah Organizational & Political Economics Winter Conference; Aspen Political Economics Conference; 2025 Western Political Science Association Conference (Scheduled); 2025 American Political Science Association Conference (Scheduled); 2025 Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (Scheduled);

Goal Complexity and Organizational Conflict with Yunus Aybas

Dynamic Public Opinion with Steven Callander

A Model of Competitive Relationship Building---Conflictual Enforcement in Relational Contracts with Álvaro Delgado-Vega